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OBSCENITY STANDARDS IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE
by Teddy M. Jones, Jr.
Is censorship necessary? Who is qualified to act as a censor? What is
the constitutional scope of censorship control? These questions hit at the
heart of a constitution which guarantees citizens a large degree of indi-
vidual liberty. The Supreme Court cannot provide the answers which
would satisfy voices on both sides of the issues. Perhaps no clear-cut
answers are possible, for absolute standards pale before the confusing bat-
tery of factors to be weighed in coming to a decision. The Court's recent
decisions in Mishkin v. New York,' Ginzburg v. United States,a and A
Book, Etc. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass.4 do not set black and white limits to
censorship control. Rather, they must be viewed as the latest chapter in
an area of law which is whipped by changing constitutional philosophy
and exposed to the turbulence of rapidly changing social mores. The first
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution prevent en-
croachment upon the freedoms of speech and press,' but "obscenity" has
been placed beyond this constitutional protection.! Defining obscenity and
applying the definition to specific materials has proved to be a difficult
judicial task. When the United States Supreme Court once again came to
grips with the problem in 1966, it decided three cases and amplified its
1957 ruling in Roth v. United States. Nevertheless, the Court left the
waters almost as murky as it found them.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF OBSCENITY LAWS
Statutory Censorship of obscenity by statute came relatively late in this
country's development. Literacy was uncommon in the early history of the
United States as a nation, and presumably those who could read were
sufficiently insulated against assault by lascivious printed matter. The first
foray into the censorship area by the Congress, in fact, was a tariff statute
designed to prevent importation of obscene "prints" and pictorial matter"
and later, representations created by the new process of photography.!
'Compare Hoover, Combating Merchants of Filth: The Role of the FBI, 25 U. PITT. L. REV.
469 (1964) with Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960) and ERNsr & SCHWARTZ, CENSORSHIP (1964).
2383 U.S. 502 (1966).
a 3 8 3 U.S. 463 (1966).4383 U.S. 413 (1966).
'U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press .
0Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7 Ibid.
'Tariff Act of 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 566. For the present provision, see 46 Star. 688, as
amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1964).
911 Stat. 168 (1857).
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During the Civil War, Congress passed its first criminal obscenity law,
ostensibly to prevent obscene mailings from being sent to its men under
10
arms.
It was not until 1873, however, that the federal government fully
entered the censorship business. Prodded by Mr. Anthony Comstock, the
Congress of that year passed, with less than one hour of floor debate, the
law which still serves as the basis of governmental regulation of obscenity
in the mails." The Comstock Act proscribed not only pictorial matter but
also printed material, mail-order advertisements of obscenity, abortifaci-
ents, contraceptives, and information as to how or where to obtain the for-
bidden materials." This statute forms the core of present legislative provi-
sions authorizing the Post Office Department to take action against ob-
scene material in the mail. Violations can be punished by fine, impris-
onment, or both.
In addition to the federal statutes, all states except New Mexico have
criminal laws designed to control or suppress obscene literature. Some en-
actments proscribe possession; others, possession with intent to sell; and
still others, advertising of obscene literature or pictures. Most of the state
regulatory statutes are directed, either primarily or secondarily, towards
control of dissemination of obscene material to minors or persons under a
certain age.'
Administrative Enforceinent Postal authorities are permitted to regulate
obscenity in the mails through two primary methods, seizure and exclu-
1013 Stat. 504 (1865).
"Comstock Act of 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598. The current statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(1964); see relevant text set out at note 12 infra.
" For many years following passage of the act, -. se Society for the Suppression of Vice, which
Mr. Comstock headed, received a portion of the fines collected in prosecutions initiated through the
work of that great vice hound. By January 1, 1874, Comstock could boast of seizing, under au-
thority of the act, 194,000 obscene pictures or photographs, 134,000 pounds of books, 14,200
stereo-view plates, 60.300 rubber articles (the nature of which is not disclosed), 5,500 sets of play-
ing cards, and 31,150 boxes of substances purporting to be aphrodisiacs. ERNST & SCHWARTZ, CEN-
SORsHIP ch. 4 (1964). Comstock's slogan during his lobbying campaign for the act of 1873 was,
"Books are Feeders for Brothels." See generally ERNST & SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra. See also Cairns,
Paul, & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical
Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1009, 1010 n.2 (1962).
The main provisions' of the present federal postal obscenity statute are:
Every obscene . . . article, matter, thing . . . or notice of any kind giving information
. . . where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned
things may be obtained . . .
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails .
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing . . . of anything declared by
this section to be nonmailable .. .shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
'aNote,.44 TEXAS L. REV. 1382, 1382 n.2 (1966). New Mexico allows municipal regulation
of obscene material. See generally, Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364,
app. 1 (1966), for a review of state criminal obscenity statutes and penalties imposed under them.
See id. at app. II for a listing of prohibited articles and action under the statutes.
"'See id. at apps. I and I.
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sion of non-mailable material and exercise of mail stoppage procedures."
All mail, except that carrying first-class postage, may be seized and in-
spected for obscenity by any mail clerk or mail carrier." In practice, how-
ever, most inspecting is done by Post Office Inspectors whose primary
function is to ferret out and examine mail which may have an obscene
content. If the inspector believes the seized material to be obscene, it will
be refused mail service and forwarded, over the signature of the local post-
master, to the Post Office Department at Washington, D.C." There agents
review the decision of the Postal Inspector, mark offending passages, and
make recommendations which are reviewed finally by the Department's
General Counsel. If at any stage of this process the material is found to
be not obscene, the mail is returned to the local postmaster with instruc-
tions to deliver the delayed mail to the addressee." Unless the addressee
notices the delay evidenced by the postmark, neither he nor the sender may
ever know of the seizure and inspection. If, however, the Department
decides that impounded mail is obscene, the local postmaster is instructed
to notify the sender that his mail has been intercepted. The notice demands
that the sender show cause why the material.should not be destroyed as
non-mailable matter and states that unless such cause is shown within
fifteen days, the material will be burned." This "show cause" notice may
follow the interception of the mail by a long period of time and will
often be the first indication to either the mailing or receiving party that
a postal seizure has taken place."
No formal hearing or protection provided by notions of administrative
or judicial due process may be afforded in the determination that mailed
"See generally de Grazia, Obscenity and the Mail: A Study of Administrative Restraint, 20
LAw & CONTEMP. PROn. 608 (1955); Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on
Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 214 (1957); Comment, Obscenity in the
Mails: Post Office Deparme)tt Procedures and the First Amendment, 58 Nw. L. REv. 664 (1963);
Note, Obscenity in Private Communication, 23 Oiiio S'r. L.J. 553 (1962). Some- commentators
point to the apparent' schizophrenic enforcement attitude taken by the Post Office Department,
i.e., the power to exclude obscenity from the mail comes from a criminal statute; but the Depart-
ment uses primarily administrative enforcement procedures to regulate obscenity. For an exhaustive
study of the legislative history of the postal obscenity statutes, see Paul, The Post Office and Non-
Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Ruv. 44 (1961). Mr. Paul concludes
that the basic congressional purpose was to provide criminal sanctions and that the postal inde-
pendent censorship program may be wholly unauthorized.
1
"de Grazia, supra note 15, at 608. This power is derived from § 1461; see relevant text of
the statute at'note 12 supra. A search warrant would be required to open and inspect first-class
mail. 74 Stat. 657 '(1960), 39 U.S.C. S 4057 (1964).
'lId. at 609.
"Ibid. See generally Sigler, Freedom of the Mails: A Developing Right, 54 GEo. L.J. 30 (1965);
Comment, Obscenity in the Mails: Post Office Department Procedures and the First Amendment,
58 Nw. L. REv. 664 (1963).
1gde Grazia, supra note 15, at 609.
" Most instances of postal inspection arise not at the beginning of the mailing process, when
an article is first deposited or offered for deposit in the mail, but rather arise after material has
started its progress in the mail flow.
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material is obscene. On occasion, when a party threatens to sue the Post-
master General or his agents, the Post Office Department has sent notice
to the interested party that a "hearing" on the mailability of his mail will
be held. 1 Much doubt surrounds the value of such a "hearing," however,
since the determination of obscenity and the seizure of mail has already
taken place. The Department assumes the role of both prosecutor and
judge in such a hearing, and no regulations promulgated by the Depart-
ment or imposed upon it set out the procedure to be followed. An ag-
grieved party seems to have a greater chance of success through an inde-
pendent court action than through the administrative remedy offered
him by the Post Office.""
The second, more drastic, method of postal administrative regulation
is through a blanket stoppage of mail."s This procedure not only denies
use of the mail for the offending matter; it can be used to stop delivery of
all mail to a sender under attack for violation of the obscenity provisions.
In 1960 Congress amended the Postal Code to provide that upon showing
of a probable violation, the Postmaster General could obtain an order from
a federal district court stopping the defendant's incoming mail." The order
remains in effect until the termination of proceedings before the Depart-
" de Grazia, supr- note 15, at 609-11. See generally Sigler, Freedome of the Mails: A Developing
Right, 54 GEo. L.J. 30 (1965). The Postal Regulations provide machinery for a hearing which
should be followed. See 39 C.F.R. § 203.3 (1966), providing that upon receipt of material of
doubtful mailability, the General Counsel of the Post Office Department, after examination, must
either (1) file a complaint with the Department's Docket Clerk or (2) forward the material to
the local postmaster with instructions to accept the material for mailing. See 39 C.F.R. §5 203.4-.5
(1966) (requisites of complaint, service of notice of hearing); 39 C.F.R. §§ 203.6-17 (1966)
(other provisions relative to hearings).
Under present Post Office Department procedures, the only supervision of mai) with-
drawal prior to a hearing is that undertaken by the General Counsel. The record of
the Post Office shows that numerous items uf constitutionally protected expression
have been detained under the guise of suppressing obscenity, only to be vindicated
ultimately. In addition, statements by some Post Office Department officials indicate
that the Department, on occasion, may have little sympathy with the distribution
of materialsncar the borderline of obscenity, and that it is often willing to withdraw
the matter from the mails first and determine its precise character later. It may be
seriously questioned, therefore, whether a truly impartial prelimi:ary dlermination
of obscenity is or can be made by the Post Office Department itself.
Sigler, supra note 21, at 671. (Emphasis added.) See generally id. at 667-77. See also Hearings Before
the Select Committee on Current Pornographic Materials of the House of Representatives, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 274 (1952). In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) the Postmaster
General unsuccessfully attempted to restrict reduced postal rates to magazines he thought to be of
literary merit.
2a74 Stat. 655 (1960), 39 U.S.C. § 4006 (1964). See de Grazia, supra note 15, at 612. An-
other lever for coercion used by the Post Office Department is the power to grant or revoke second-
class mailing permits. This is especially effective with magazines depending on mail delivery to sus-
tain their circulation. The Department formerly regarded second-class mailing privileges as a merit
badge award for good character. See 1942 POsTMAS'rIR GEN. ANN. REP. 12. This practice was
ended by the Supreme Court's decision in Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946). Compare
Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904) with Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
See note 21 supra.
"474 Stat. 655 (1960), as amended, 76 Stat. 444 (1962), 39 U.S.C. § 4007 (1964).
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ment to determine the character of the material being challenged. Re-
sponding to judicial limitation of prior postal procedures," Congress pro-
vided that the court's order may be restricted to stopping only such mail
as is connected with the alleged unlawful activity. Another benefit to the
defendant which may be incorporated in the court's order is the privilege
of opening and examining the mail detained by the Post Office.'
Though there is evidence indicating that the Department has exercised
this mail-stoppage provision sparingly and that it has used hearings on
occasion, its mere presence in a statutory scheme of postal obscenity con-
trol puts a potent weapon at the disposal of the Department.
judicial Restriction of Administrative Control With the lack of proce-
dural due process inherent in the above methods, there is little wonder that
the wide-open powers given to the postal censors have been somewhat
curbed by judicial decision. The seizing of mail believed by a postal inspec-
tor to be obscene without prior notice or hearing upon the obscenity issue
was held to be beyond the scope of postal authority in Walker v. Pope-
noe." A restriction on the Department's powers to exercise the blanket
mail stoppage was incorporated in Summerfield v. Sunshine Book. Co. 8
Post Office authorities had determined, after a hearing, that nudist publica-
tions of the Sunshine Book Company were obscene. Subsequently the De-
partment ordered that all mail addressed to the company be stopped,
marked unlawful, and returned to the senders. Sunshine, faced with im-
minent business and financial disaster, made application for a temporary
restraining order and an injunction staying the mail-stoppage order. The
court of appeals upheld the lower court's granting of these two remedies,
holding that no blanket mail-stcppage order could issue. A mail-stoppage
order could be directed only at the specific publications found at a pre-
viously conducted hearing to be obscene, not at the entirety of defendant's
mail volume.
The Post Office, however, has seemingly relegated Walker v. Popenoe
and Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co. to the dead-letter file. In practice
prior notice and hearing is not always given before seizing or excluding
mail thought to be obscene.2 Though provisions for fair and full hearings
have been incorporated in some departmental rules, the Department still
" Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co., 221 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921
(1955); Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
2674 Stat. 655 (1960), as amended, 76 Stat. 444 (1962), 39 U.S.C. § 4007 (1964).
27149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
"221 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955).
29 Comment, Obscenity in the Mails: Post Office Department Procedures and the First Amend-
ment, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 664, 667-81 (1963); de Grazia, supra note 15; Note, Obscenity in Pri-
vate Communication, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 553 (1962). See discussion at notes 21-22 supra.
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seems to regard the use of hearings as discretionary, not as an obligatory
procedural standard.30
Criminal Prosecutions Violations of the basic postal obscenity provision,
section 1461, are subject to criminal sanctions. A device most advantag-
eous in prosecutions for mailing obscene material is the "forum-shopping"
provision enacted in 1958 at the behest of the Post Office Department.'
The Department had encountered some difficulty obtaining convictions
since juries drawn from metropolitan centers tended to be more liberal
than the postal inspectors and often adopted a more sophisticated view
toward material in question. An earlier Tenth Circuit case had held that a
defendant in a case brought under the obscenity statute could be prose-
cuted only at the point of mailing. 2 To withdraw this thorn in the side
of the postal prosecutors, Congress enacted legislation allowing prosecu-
tion of a mailer at any point through which the material passed in the
course of its journey through the mails. This made it possible for the Gov-
ernment to shift the scene of prosecution from New York or Los Angeles
-the two primary mailing points from which mail-order purveyors op-
erated-to more isolated rural hamlets where the level of literary sophisti-
cation did not run quite so high.
II. JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF OBSCENITY STANDARDS
Armed with the statutory provisions and administrative procedures,
postal control over the moral and literary content of the nation's mails
would seem almost complete."3 If the statutes were the only criteria, such
" See discussion at notes 21-23 supra. There is some indication that the Department is moving
closer to applying the procedural standards of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. See Cut-
ler, The Post Office and the Administrative Procedure. Act, 47 Nw. U.L. Ri y. 72, 73 (1952).
For provisions relative to hearings before the Department in obscenity determinations, see 39
C.F.R. §§ 203.3-17 (1966). See also Sigler, supra note 21.
31 72 Stat. 962 (1958), amending 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964). The amendment shifted the grava-
men of the offense from depositing obscene material in the mail to using the mails for carriage of
the material. Thus, a defendant could be prosecuted in the district of deposit, the district of de-
livery, or in any district through which the material passed. United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp.
160 (N.D. Iowa 1965). In United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966)
defendants were convicted of mailing a book from California to Michigan in violation of §§ 1461
and 1462 (importation or transportation of obscene matters in interstate or foreign commerce).
The court held that the defendants had no constitutional right to trial in their district of resi-
dence, California; neither did the court recognize their claim to a discretionary change of venue.
See United States v. Sidelko, 248 F. Ssipp. 813 (M.D. Penn. 1965), explaining the intent of Con-
gress in amending § 1461 to permit forum-shopping. See also Hearings on Control of Obscene
Material Before Subcommittee on Constitutional Anendinenis and Su/bcomnmittee To Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 18
(1960). For cases decided under the old form of § 1461 and holding that a defendant could be
prosecuted only at the point of mailing, see United States v. Ross, 203 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953);
cf., United States v. Comerford, 25 Fed. 902 (W.D. Tex. 1885).
3 United States v. Ross, 205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953). See note 31 sujpra.
3 The Post Office Department has made several recent requests to Congress asking for further
congressional action on the postal obscenity laws. These proposals have centered mainly upon freeing
the Department from the current scope of judicial review. The means of lifting the judicial review
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would no aoubt be the case.3 ' The proponents of vigorous censorship and
advocates of more strict postal control, however, have had to temper their
enthusiasm for the statutory and administrative framework in view of the
judicial restraint placed upon the censor's operation." Construing the
permissible sphere of censorship activity and the standards by which al-
legedly obscene material must be judged, courts have drawn a constitu-
tional out-of-bounds line, beyond which censorship activity may not be
carried." The measurements of this line are not subject to exact calcula-
tion; indeed, it is often redrawn for each match. Though the first amend-
ment limits are shifting and though relevant factors sometimes change,
courts have always taken the view that speech and expression must be
protected from arbitrary and unreasonable encroachment. Confusion at the
bar and on the bench often results from the very nature of attempting to
establish constitutional guidelines. A more subjective and personal task
could hardly be imagined than determining what can be censored and
what cannot. A tracing of the problem through the judicial annals of
the United States illustrates the degree to which personal value judgments
by individual judges have shaped the law.
The original judicial test for obscenity was established in the English
case of Regina v. Hicklin.a' That case concerned the suppression and seizure
of an anti-Catholic pamphlet. In deciding the case, Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn formulated the standard by which literature would be judged
for almost one hundred years: "[W]hether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open
to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this
sort may fall."' The Hicklin rule as announced and as applied thus would
condemn any book or publicacion if the effect of any part thereof would
tend to corrupt the weaker or more susceptible members of society.
vary according to the proposal in question. For example, the Post Office has asked that power of
federal courts to enjoin enforcement of mail-impounding orders be limited to cases where issuance
was arbitrary or capricious. A more drastic measure submitted by the Department would be to
shift the scene of initial review of departmental orders from the federal district courts to the
United States courts of appeals. It resented very much, apparently, the tendency of federal dis-
trict oourts to review its findings in a de novo manner. As a corresponding measure, the Department
requested that its findings be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Adoption of this
criterion would foreclose effective review of the finding central to most actions-that of obscenity
of the material in question. Hearings, supra note 31, at 21-22, 78-88, 106-14. See notes 21-22
supra and accompanying text.
'See relevant text of S 1461 at note 12 supra; notes 21, 22, 24, and 33 supra.
' See, e.g., statements of the Postmaster General and officers of citizens "decency" groups, col-
lected in Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960).
"'See A Book, Etc. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 315
U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield,
355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Mounce v. United States, 355
U.S. 180, reversing 247 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1957).
37 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
31 Id. at 371.
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Although disturbed by the results of the application of this Hicklin
standard, American courts nevertheless felt constrained to follow it. Judge
Learned Hand, for example, protested vigorously against continued use
of the rule although applying it to the case before him:
I hope it is not improper for me to say that the rule as laid down, how-
ever consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not seem to me
to answer to the understanding and morality of the present time .... Indeed,
it seems hardly likely that we are even to-day so luke-warm in our interest
in letters or serious discussion as to be content to reduce our treatment of
sex to the standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious
few, or that shame will for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some
of the most serious and beautiful sides of human nature ....
[S]hould not the word 'obscene' be allowed to indicate the present critical
point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community
may have arrived here and now? . . . To put thought in leash to the average
conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities
of the lowest and least capable seems a fatal policy."9
Despite judicial criticism, the Hicklin rule was firmly entrenched as the
legal standard for obscenity until the Second Circuit's decision in the Ulys-
ses case.' James Joyce's novel had been published in Paris in 1922. At no
time after its initial publication had it been legal to publish the book or to
import a copy within the United States. The book was replete with four-
letter words and contained accounts of the characters' thoughts which in-
cluded rather explicit sexual fantasy. Critics believed the book to be an
important literary experiment introducing the "stream of consciousness"
technique. The publishers sought a ruling that the book was not obscene
so that eventual publication within the United States would be possible.
The district co-urt held that the book was not obscene but that it was an
honest attempt on the part of the author to utilize the "stream of con-
sciousness" technique for the legitimate purpose of portraying fully the
thoughts and desires of his characters.41 The Second Circuit upheld the
ruling of non-obscenity and attempted to establish new elements for a
'9 United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
4United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), affirming 5 F.
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). Random House, the publishing firm, ordered a copy of the book,
expecting it to be impounded while passing through customs inspection. In fact, the book slipped
through customs without objection and had to be returned to the inspectors for a ruling. The case
was tried under the Tariff Law of 1930 which allowed an in rem proceeding against the book
rather than a criminal action against the person who ordered the copy. ERNST & SCHWARTZ, CEN-
SORSHIP 94 (1964). See generally id. at ch. 14.
41 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72
F.2d 705 (2d Cit. 1934) (Judges L. Hand and A. Hand). Though most authorities cite the opinion
of the circuit court in discussing the Ulysses case, an examination of Judge Woolsey's district court
opinion can be enlightening in determining how an individual judge makes a ruling on obscenity.
The opinion and the record show that Judge Woolsey made an honest attempt to understand
Joyce's technique and writing style. The importance of this attempt to consider the literary value




finding of obscenity.' The fact that the book might arouse lustful thoughts
among some persons would not bring it within the scope of the obscenity
statute. The court further stated, "We believe that the proper test of
whether a given book is obscene is its dominant effect .... [I]t does not fall
within the statute, even though it justly may offend many.""' Recognizing
the need for an evaluation of social importance, the court opened the
door to a consideration of literary worth:
In applying this test, relevancy of the objectionable parts to the theme, the
established reputation of the work in the estimation of approved critics,
if the book is modern, and the verdict of the past, if it is ancient, are per-
suasive pieces of evidence; for works of art are not likely to sustain a high
position with no better warrant for their existence than their obscene con-
tent."
Thus, the highly restrictive elements of the Hicklin rule-ignoring the so-
cial value of the work, judging an entire work by isolated passages often
out of context, and giving determinative effect to the tendency to corrupt
minds most open to such influence-were laid aside in favor of a test which
gave consideration to the overall literary merit and social impact of ques-
tioned material. But the Ulysses holding impliedly retained the underlying
assumption upon which the Hicklin rule was based: that exposure to cer-
tain types of literary expression could have such profound social conse-
quences that a degree of control by the State upon public selection of read-
ing material could be justified.'
Although Ulysses was persuasive authority, it was not controlling.
Therefore, many courts adopted the new standards; while others clung
to the old Hicklin rule." Courts continued to determine obscenity without
applying any uniform standard. Some deemed material obscene that "sug-
gested" or "aroused" lustful thoughts; others approved suppression of




"Id. at 708. See generally Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, 18 HASTINos L.J.
161 (1966).
" See Cairns, Paul, & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and
the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1009 (1962); Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10
WAYNE L. REv. 655 (1964). There is no clear-cut evidence that exposure to "obscene" material
will cause a significant rise in anti-social sexual activity. Cairns, Paul, & Wishner, supra. Without
delving too deeply into the realm of psychiatry, it may be noted that the extent to which a person
could be affected by obscenity probably depends upon his susceptibility to sexual fantasy. Ibid. See
also de Grazia, supra note 15, criticizing the Post Office Department for attempting to deal with
social problems so inexorably tied to personal conduct and preference. There is some support for
the proposition that exposure to pornography will decrease the amount of anti-social activity; the
theory is that exposure to this sort of material acts as an "escape valve" for tendencies which
would otherwise manifest themselves in overt acts. Murphy, supra.
"Compare Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945) with State v. Becker, 364 Mo.
1097, 272 S.W.2d 283 (1954). As late as 1953 a United States court of appeals approved customs
seizure of books because, inter alia, nothing in the writing had "the grace of purity or goodness."
Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1953).
1967]
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incitement to sexual desire." Literary merit, an important factor in and
contribution of the Ulysses decision, was not always considered." General-
ly, the suppression of material was based on the material's effect on
thoughts, conduct, community moral standards, or its offensiveness. Courts
divided as to how the audience should be determined in order to judge the
potential effect or offensiveness." There were no guidelines laid down by
the Supreme Court, and lower courts handed down a plethora of deci-
sions characterized only by their inconsistency and confusion.
The Roth Standards The Supreme Court entered this area in 1957 with
its decision of Roth v. United States." Roth and its companion case, Al-
berts v. California, presented only the issues of whether the federal and
California obscenity statutes violated the freedom of expression and the
definiteness requirements of the United States Constitution. There was no
consideration of whether the materials actually vended were, in fact, ob-
scene. The Court ruled that both statutes in question were constitutional
and affirmed both convictions."1
Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority of five, held that ob-
scenity "is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press."" But he carefully pointed out that not all material dealing with or
related to sex was obscene:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion-have the full protection of the [First Amendment] guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited areas of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."
Brennan further defined obscenity as "material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest"5 and approved the following test
.r See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 35, at 49-58.E F.g., State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1097, 272 S.W.2d 283 (1954).
" See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 35, at 49-58.
50 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Samuel Roth had been indicted for violating the federal statute pro-
hibiting the mailing of obscene material and advertising the sale of such matter for dissemination
through the mails. In the trial court, the judge instructed the jury that obscenity was that "form
of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity and has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.
[ . . it] must be calculated to corrupt and debauch the minds and morals of those into whose
hands it may fall." 354 U.S. at 508. The judge tempered this Hickin-type instruction by advising
the jury that they must consider the material as a whole and that its effect must be judged as that
upon the average member of the community. But there was no mention of considering literary or
social values in determining whether the material was obscene. Ibid. The companion case to Roth,
Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1954), was decided in the same opinion. Albrrts was an
appeal from a conviction for keeping obscene material for sale and for advertising obscene matter
in violation of a California obscenity statute. WEST'S CAL. PENAL COnE ANN. § 311 (1955).
5' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 494 (1957).
5 Id. at 485. The majority was composed of Justices Brennan, Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and
Whittaker.
5aid. at 484-85. (Emphasis added.)
54 Id. at 487. Brennan makes clear, however, that the mere portrayal of sex in art or literature
is not sufficient to warrant a finding of obscenity. See quotation at text accompanying note 53 supra.
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in determining whether material was obscene: ". . . whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."5 The Court
expressly rejected the Hicklin standard as being in violation of constitu-
tional freedoms of speech and press.
Brennan's use of the phrase "prurient interest" does very little to clarify
the attempted definition of obscenity. The Roth opinion goes further in
explaining prurient interest by stating that the element is present in ma-
terial "having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. . . ."" The term pru-
rient is defined by dictionaries as "marked by restless craving ...itching
with curiosity ...having or easily susceptible to lasciviousness .... ."'
None of these definitions seem particularly well suited for use in a consti-
tutional test for obscenity. The Court borrowed the use of the term from
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code,"8 and Brennan states in
the majority opinion in Roth that "we perceive no significant difference
between the meaning of obscenity developed in case law and the defini-
tion of the A.L.I. Model Penal Code. . . ."' But the draftsmen of the code
expressly rejected the test of "tendency to arouse lustful thoughts" which
Brennan incorporates into the definition of material appealing to prurient
interest."0 Thus, while the Court uses the terminology of the Model Penal
Code approach, it rejects its underlying definitional basis.
One aspect of the old Hicklin rule, generally recognized as being unduly
restrictive, was the use of the most susceptible members of society to de-
termine the impact of the material in question. In Roth, however, the
Court speaks of the "average" or "normal" person as the hypothetical in-
5' Id. at 489. This test has been applied by the Court in its obscenity cases following Roth. See,
e.g., A Book, Etc. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S.
371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1937);.Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S.
372 (1958), reversing 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180,
reversing 247 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1957).
"8Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).57 
WEBSTER'S Ncw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged, 3d ed. 1961).
83 54 U.S. at 487 n.20; MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
" Mr. Justice Harlan points out the apparent inconsistency between the Court's accepted defini-
tion of "prurient" and that held by the draftsmen of the code.
We reject the prevailing test of tendency to arouse lustful thoughts or desires because
it is unrealistically broad for a society that plainly tolerates a great deal of erotic in-
terest in literature, advertising, and art, and because regulation of thought or desire,
unconnected with overt misbehavior, raises the most acute constitutional as well as
practical difficulties. We likewise reject the common definition of obscene as that
which 'tends to corrupt or debase.' If this means anything different from tendency
to arouse lustful thought and desire, it suggests that change of character or actual
misbehavior follows from contact with obscenity. Evidence of such consequences is
lacking.
354 U.S. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., concurring in Alberts and dissenting in Roth), quoting from
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), Comments, at 10 (Emphasis added.).
It seems as if the "most acute constitutional . .. difficulties" foreseen by the code draftsmen in
using the test of "tendency to arouse lustful thoughts" were missed by the majority in Roth,
for this test was accepted without question.
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dividual to whose prurient interest the material must appeal." t Though the
Court did away with the possibility of reversion to the old Hicklin stand-
ard, it did little in further defining the community from which this "av-
erage" person is to be chosen. Does the group include children and men-
tally imbalanced individuals? Is it a composite nation-wide community?
Can the "community" be regarded as those persons living in one city, one
state, one geographic area of the country? These questions may be Frr-
ticularly significant in prosecutions in which the Government has forced
trial thousands of miles from the defendant's home or from the place
where mailing was effected. 2 The definition of community thus may have
a marked effect on the standard by which literature or other material is
judged. Another nagging question the Court passed over in Roth was
whether a special "community" should be used in considering material of
a particular nature, appealing to particular interests. "
In addition to making the "normal" or "average" person part of a con-
stitutional standard for judging the effect of material, the Court finally
disposed of another lingering vestige of the Hicklin rule, the tendency to
judge material on the basis of isolated passages or words. Rejecting such a
limited scope, the Court made mandatory an appraisal based on the entire
work.' Whether passages which would be obscene in themselves are vitia-
ted by being merely relevant to the author's dominant theme or whether
their use had to be necessary to a conveying of the dominant theme or
idea was left unanswered. Objective necessity to convey an idea or a theme
probably would not be required; lower courts, in fact, have rejected such
a necessity test in an obscenity determination." It would seem that a jury
or a judge is most unsuitable to determine whether particular passages are
necessary to an author's literary purpose.
Although it spoke of obscenity as "utterly without redeeming social
importance,"" the Court did not absolutely require a weighing of redeem-
ing social importance in its Roth standard. The opposite side of the coin,
however, seems to indicate that material which has even slight social im-
613 54 U.S. at 489-90. But cf., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); see text accom-
panying notes 91-93 infra.
62 See discussion at note 31 supra; text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
63 Mr. Chief Justice Warren argued in a separate concurring opinion in Roth for a concept of
variable obscenity. He would relate the effect of the material to the deviant interest group for
which it was primarily disseminated. Compare Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) with
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 494 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring in separate opinion).
See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 35, at 68-88; Semonche, Definitional and Contextual Ob-
scenity: The Supremie Court's New and Disturbing Accoumnodation, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1173
(1966); Comnsent, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALLu L.J. 1364 (1966); Note, 44 TEXAS
L. REv. 1382 (1966).
64 The Court thus expressly rejected the Hicklin test as "unconstitutionally restrictive of the
freedoms of speech and press." 354 U.S. at 489; see text accompanying notes 37-45 supra.
a6 E.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
66354 U.S. at 489; cf., A Book, Etc. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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portance is not obscene. This view was sustained in later cases in which the
Court made non-obscenity determinations using the Roth rule."
Later application of the Roth standard made it clear that the decision
could not be viewed as a victory for the censors."' The Court in 1959 added
another chalk mark to its out-of-bounds line by putting an end to con-
cepts of "ideological obscenity." In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of N.Y., the Court overturned a decision of the New
York Court of Appeals which had censored the motion picture, Lady
Chatterley's Lover, because it "alluringly portrays adultery as proper be-
havior.""0 The import of this decision was that no longer could communi-
cation which advocated unconventional ideas or "immoral" behavior by
current standards be suppressed on that ground alone. Giving weight to
the first amendment's protection of ideas, Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
[The constitutional guarantee] is not confined to the expression of ideas that
are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion
that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or
the single tax. And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is elo-
quent no less than that which is unconvincing."
The Court ruled in Smith v. California that a state must prove crim-
inal intent as an element of a conviction under a state criminal obscenity
statute." The decision was based on the fear of the Court that state ob-
scenity statutes operated as "self-executing" restrictions on dissemination
of books, many of which would not be obscene. Strict criminal liability,
with no element of scienter, might limit booksellers to sale of books which
they had personally inspected. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, probably
most accurately described the practical effect of Smith v. California when
he stated, "What the Court does today may possibly provide some small
degree of safeguard to booksellers by making those who patrol bookstalls
proceed less highhandedly than has been their custom.""
III. THE 1966 TRILOGY-GINZBURG, MISHKIN, AND FANNY HILL
The. recent cases decided by the Supreme Court do not change the basic
validity of the Roth tests. In applying Roth standards to the cases before
"TSee the per curiam reversals by the Court in applying the Rotb rule to lower court convic-
tions or findings of obscenity, in Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), re-
versivg 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241
F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180, reversing 247 F.2d 148 (9th
Cir. 1957). See also Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speec--Tests of Ob-euity, 15 Sw.
L.J. 336 (1961).
"Cases cited note 67 supra.
09360 U.S. 684 (1959).
70Id. at 686-87.
71 Id. at 689.
7s361 U.S. 147 (1959).
7"Id. at 169. (Douglas, J., concurring in separate opinion).
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it, however, the Court refined and expanded the basic rules set out in
1957.' 4
A. Ginzburg v. United States"9
Ralph Ginzburg was convicted in the lower court for violating the
federal obscenity statute by mailing obscene publications and advertise-
ments relating how and where the obscene publications could be obtained."
The Third Circuit affirmed," and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In considering and dismissing possible literary merit or redeeming social
value of the material Ginzburg mailed, Mr. Justice Brennan, delivering
the opinion of the majority, introduced a new element to the Roth test.
The determination of obscenity of the publications was buttressed by the
Court's finding that their sale was in the course of "the sordid business
of pandering.""8 Ginzburg's commercial exploitation of erotic material, his
emphasis upon the prurient appeal of the publications, and the salacious
nature of his promotional and merchandising techniques were cited in
finding the pandering element present as a factor to be used in determin-
ing obscenity."9 Thus, the character of a defendant and the nature of his
business activity should now be evaluated in an obscenity case. Though
Mr. Justice Brennan stated that this element was relevant to application
of the Roth test and seemingly implied that it had been incorporated into
7' See Dyson, Looking-Glass Law: An Analysis of the Ginzburg Case, 28 U. PITT. L. REv. I
(1966); Semonche, Definitional and Contextual Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Dis-
turbing Accommodation, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1173 (1966); Comment, More Ado About Dirty
Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364 (1966); Note, 15 Sw. L.J. 336 (1961); Note, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 1382
(1966).
,s383 U.S. 463 (1966).
7' See relevant text' of the statute at note 12 snpra.
" Ginzburg v. United States, 338 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
78 383 U.S. at 467.
v Ginzburg sought mailing privileges from the postmasters of Blue Ball and Intercourse, Penn-
sylvania. Being denied mailing permits from these two towns, he ultimately selected as his mailing
point Middlesex, New Jersey. The trial court found that these permits were sought only for the
Value of their names in postmarking. The Supreme Court deemed this an "obvious" conclusion.
383 U.S. at 467-68.
The three questioned publications were Eros, a hard-cover magazine which was printed and bound
in an expensive manner; Liason, a bi-weckly newsletter; and The Housewife's Handbook on Selective
Promniscuity, a short book. Eros was devoted to treatment of sex and contained fifteen articles
dealing with love, sex, and sexual relations. Some of the articles were photo-essays. The Handbook
claimed to be a sexual a2,tobiography relating in detail the author's sexual experiences and emotions
from age three to age thirty-six. Liason, the newsletter, through a "Letter From the Editors," stated
as its purpose, "keeping sex an art and preventing it from becoming a science." 383 U.S. at 466.
The Court found that advertising for the material "openly boasted that the publishers would take
full advantage of what they regarded as an unrestricted license allowed by law in the expression
of sex and sexual matters." 383 U.S. at 468. Is the Court thus saying that attempting to take ad-
vantage of license allowed by law can be a factor in affirming a criminal conviction if the wrong
motives are present?
Today the Court assumes the power to deny Ralph Ginzburg the protection of the
First Amendment because it disapproves of his 'sordid business.' That is a power the
Court does not possess. For the First Amendment protects us all with an even hand.
It applies to Ralph Ginzburg with no less completeness and force than to G. P. Put-
nam Sons.
383 U.S. at 501 (Stewart, J., dissenting in separate opinion).
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the Roth standard for some time, " it is clear that the new element might
significantly alter possible results obtained under Roth. Brennan implied
that this element of pandering may even be determinative:
[T]he circumstances of presentation and dissemination of material are equally
relevant to determining whether social importance claimed for material in the
courtroom was, in the circumstances, pretense or reality-whether it was the
basis upon which it was traded in the marketplace or a spurious claim for
litigation purposes. Where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually
provocative aspects of his publications, that fact may be decisive in the
determination of obscenity."'
At another point he stated:
It is important to stress that this analysis simply elaborates the test by
which the obscenity vel non of the material must be judged. Where an
exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography is shown with respect
to material lending itself to such exploitation through pervasive treatment
or description of sexual matters, such evidence may support the determination
that the material is obscene even though in other contexts the materials would
escape such condemnation."'
The conclusion is inescapable that Ginzburg has added pandering as an
element of the Roth test, or at the least as an element in determining
whether "redeeming social value" is present. At first reading, one is temp-
ted to doubt the wisdom of the Court in introducing pandering into the
constitutional criteria. The Court almost seems to be saying that a book can
be judged by its cover."
This pandering element could have far-reaching effects. As two mem-
bers of the Court state, the decision effectively rewrites the postal obscen-
ity statute. 4 'When the Court states that a book, not otherwise obscene,
88383 U.S. at 471-76. There is some indication that Mr. Justice Brennan is at least partially
right. Though pandering has never been set out expressly as a separate element, there is evidence
that judges have used it as a subjective factor nevertheless. See, e.g., United States v. One Book
Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), where
Judge Woolsey finds no "leer of the sensualist" present in the book or its dissemination. See also
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 494 (Warren, C. J., concurring in separate opinion).
8' Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966) (Emphasis added.)
s2 Id. at 475-76 (Emphasis added.).
83 One commentator finds the Ginzburg rationale to lie within the field of estoppel. By adding
to the Court's language a phrase which logically seems to follow, the result indeed seems to be
allied closely to the doctrine of estoppel. "Where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually
provocative aspects of his publications, that fact may be decisive in the determination of obscenity,
as against a later assertion by him to the contrary." 383 U.S. at 470 (added phrase in italics);
Dyson, Looking-Glass Law: An Analysis of the Ginzburg Case, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1966).
Another conclusion easily drawn from the case is that Ginzburg's conviction was sustained not
because of the nature of the material he sold but because of how he sold it. Dyson, supra, at 14.
Ginzburg introduces a concept of variable obscenity, i.e., what will be judged obscene in one situ-
ation might not in another setting. See also Semonche, supra note 74. See generally Dyson, supra;
Semonche, supra note 74; Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 1364 (1966); Note, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 1382
(1966).
'Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 477, 494 (1966) (Black, J., and Harlan, J., each
dissenting in separate opinions); see generally Dyson, Looking-Glass Law: An Analysis of the Ginz-
burg Case, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1966); Semonche, Definitional and Contextual Obscenity: The
Supreme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1173 (1966).
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may be made obscene through the manner in which it is offered for sale,
this seems to be opening the door to widespread abuse of the censorship
power. The concept of pandering can mean so many different things in
various contexts that its use in a constitutional standard for freedom of
expression is inviting abuse on the enforcement level. As Mr. Justice Doug-
las pointed out in his dissent in Ginzburg, society is being exposed constant-
ly to sex-oriented advertisements. "The sexy advertisement neither adds to
nor detracts from the quality of the merchandise being offered for sale.
And I do not see how it adds to or detracts one whit from the legality of
the book being distributed. A book should stand on its own, irrespective
of the reasons why it was written or the wiles used in selling it."'" As sub-
jective as the Roth test already was, the introduction of pandering as an
element makes it even more so. In fairness to the Court, however, pander-
ing probably was intended for use only in a very close case where there was
almost no other way to determine social value."' This implied limitation
loses some of its force, however, in considering that enforcers of obscen-
ity statutes have not always displayed a great degree of comprehension
when applying such technical legal niceties to their proposed course of
action under authorizing statutes."
B. Mishkin v. New York"s
Mishkin was convicted of violating the New York obscenity statute
by producing and selling allegedly obscene books." The subject matter
covered by the books depicted almost all types of normal and abnormal
"'Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 482 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" At least this seems to be the way enforcement agencies regard Ginzburg. Memorandum of
United States Department of Justice on Effect of Recent Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions
(1966); Memorandum of Houston District Attorney's Office to Enforcement Officers (1966).
87E.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1962). The assistant prosecutor in the case had
used his customary constitutional test for obscenity-if he didn't want his thirteen-year-old daugh-
ter reading the material, it was obscene. See generally Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Ob-
scenity: The Deresoping Constilutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 6-12 (1960). This ex-
ample drawn from many cited by the authors is not an exception; other abuses can be found in
coercion of booksellers by enforcement officers. Lockhart & McClure, supra, at 6-12. At times
the Post Office Department has seemed to be carried away with enforcing the postal obscenity
regulations; the Department's enforcement at other times may have been politically motivated.
Day, Mailing Lists and Pornography, 52 A.B.A.J. 1103, 1104 (1966). Former Postmaster General
J. Edward Day discussed the attitude of his predecessor:
Incredible as it seems, my predecessor set up, in a large conference room across from
his office, a -museum' with samples of pornography divided among various perver-
sions. Members of the press, of Congress, and of the public, both men and women,
were given guided tours through this room, which came to be known as the Chamber
of Horrors. The worst items were behind a black curtain equipped with a draw string
for display as the climax of the tour.
Day, supra, at 1104.
ss383 U.S. 502 (1966).
"oN.Y. Penal Code, 39 McKINNEY's CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y. ch. 40, § 1141 (Supp. 1966).
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sexual activity, including sado-machoism, fetishism, and homosexuality."0
Mishkin contended that the New York court had misapplied the prurient
appeal requirement of the Roth test. He contended that since most of his
material appealed to various classes of people with deviant sex preferences,
this material could not possibly appeal to the prurient interest of the
taverage" or "normal" person. The Court rejected this position as being
an unrealistic interpretation of the Roth prurient interest requirement.'
In so holding, the Court filled one of the voids left by the Roth decision:
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly
defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large, the prurient-
appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of the mem-
bers of that group. The reference to the 'average' or 'normal' person in Roth
... does not foreclose this holding ... We adjust the prurient-appeal require-
ment to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to
be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable
recipient group .... 92
The delineation of a group or "community" according to deviate sexual
preferences aids in determining the effect of certain material, but the re-
quirement of intent to reach that group almost counterbalances the value
of the clarification. Suppose an author wrote a book concerning sexually
deviate activity and that material in the work would appeal to the prurient
interest of a deviate group, considering the work as a whole. Suppose fur-
ther that there is evidence indicating that the work was sold mainly to
persons who constitute such deviate group but evidence of an intent to
make that group the main target of dissemination is lacking. Taking the
language of Mishkin that the material must be "designed for and primar-
ily disseminated to" the deviant group and that material is to be judged in
terms of "its intended" recipient group, prosecution might not be possible
in the situation presented."5 Some types of material, mainly "hard-core
pornography" having little or no possible social value, will be suppressed
by this new test of the "community." When there is a question raised as
to the intended audience or the intent of a publisher or purveyor, the in-
90383 U.S. at 505. Among the literary gems being purveyed by Mishkin were the following
titles, Dance With the Dominant Whip, Cult of the Spankers, Screaming Flesh, So Firm So Fully
Packed, The Strap Returns, Peggy's Distress on Planet Venus, etc. For a complete listing of titles,
see 383 U.S. at 514-15.
91383 U.S. at 508.
92383 U.S. at 508-09. But cf., United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir, 1965). The
Mishkin modification of Roth standards also interjects concepts of variable and contextual ob-
scenity. See Semonche, Definitional and Contextual Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Dis-
turbing Accommodation, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1173, 1190-94 (1966).
9 See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text. United States v. One Carton Positive Motion
Picture Film Entitled "491," 367 F.2d 889 (1966) takes the position that prurient interest to the




tent element necessary to a sub-division of the normal "community" into
separate deviant groups may be difficult to ascertain and to prove.
C. A Book, Etc. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass."4
This case was an appeal from a civil equity action brought under the
Massachusetts obscenity statute against the book itself, as distinguished
from a criminal action against its publisher or purveyor. John Cleland's
book, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, deals with the life of an English
prostitute, Fanny Hill. The book as a whole gives an insight into a period
of English history, portraying the life, habits, customs, mores, and morals
as they existed at that time. Although it contains explicit accounts of
sexual relations, it does so without use of "vulgar" or "four-letter" words.
The Massachusetts court stated that the test for obscenity did not have to
be whether the book was unqualifiedly "worthless" in a consideration of
social value. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, stating:
A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeem-
ing social value. This is so even though the book is found to possess the
requisite prurient appeal and to be patently offensive. Each of the three
federal constitutional criteria is to be applied independently; the social value
of the book can neither be weighed against nor cancelled by its prurient appeal
or patent offensiveness."5
The Court also set out the three necessary elements under the modified
Roth test for a finding of obscenity:
Under [the test] . . . three elements must coalesce: it must be established
that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value."
No evidence of how the book was advertised or distributed was entered
in the trial court; so the only issue before the Supreme Court was the ob-
" 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
5 Isd. at 413. Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in Fanny Hill, suggests that the requirement of
"patent offensiveness" was not a part of the original Roth test and was taken from the opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan in Manual Enterprises v. Day. 383 U.S. at 442. Compare Manual Enterprises
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 485-88 (1961).
S -, U.S. at 419-20. Mr. Justice Clark dissents upon the ground that to impose the require-
ment of lacking any social value is to impose upon the Roth standards a new element. 383 US.
at 441-10 (Clark, J., dissenting in separate opinion). Clark perhaps ignores some language in Roth
which lays the foundation for such a test. See quotation at text accompanying note 53 supra. See
also language in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). Mr. Justice White dissents for much
the same reason. He would view social importance not as an independent element or test but only
as a factor to consider in determining if predominant prurient interest is present. 383 U.S. at 460-62.
(White J., dissenting in separate opinion). Mr. Justice Harlan dissented separately; Douglas con-
curred separately; Black and Stewart concurred for reasons stated in their Ginzburg and Mishkin
dissenting opinions. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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scenity of the work. The Court did note, though, that the pandering ele-
ment introduced into the Roth test by the Ginzburg case might have com-
pelled a different result if facts raising the issue were present in the case.
But the Court was also careful to point out in Fanny Hill that the mere
fact of possible exploitation by pandering could not be used in a finding
of obscenity."
D. The Minority Views
Several members of the Supreme Court hold independent views of pro-
per obscenity tests or of the constitutional scope of censorship review.
Thus, a true "majority" opinion is often not possible, although a majority
may concur in a result.
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Harlan are both of the opinion that
the federal government, through its postal and tariff statutes, is empowered
to suppress only that category of material known as "hard-core pornog-
raphy."" If this view were accepted, another definitional question would
arise, i.e., what is hard-core pornography? Mr. Justice Stewart has never
attempted to give a precise definition of this type of material, but he has
stated, "I know hard-core pornography when I see it."" Perhaps this is
the only definition possible."
Although Mr. Justice Harlan concurs with Justice Stewart as to the
power of the federal government to suppress only hard-core pornography,
he would not apply this same restriction to the states. Rather, the states
would be free to apply their own standards of obscenity, subject presum-
'"A Book, Etc. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 420-21 (1966); see notes 79-86
supra and accompanying text. See generally Dyson, supra note 83; Semonche, supra note 92; Com-
ment, 75 YALE L.J. 1364 (1966); Note, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 1382 (1966).
"See, e.g., A Book, Etc. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting in separate opini6n); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 497 (1966) (Stewart,
J., dissenting in separate opinion).
"'Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring in separate'opinion).
The only attempt at definition Mr. Justice Stewart has made is found in a footnote. This listing
of material probably would be neither comprehensive nor exclusionary. Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 464, 499 n.3 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting). His list follows:
• . .Such materials include photographs, both still and motion picture, with no pre-
tense of artistic value, graphically depicting acts of sexual intercourse, including
various acts of sodomy and sadism, and sometimes involving several participants in
scenes of orgy-like character. They also include strips of drawings in comic-book
format grossly depicting similar activities in an exaggerated fashion. There are, in
addition, pamphlets and booklets, sometimes with photographic illustrations, verbally
describing such activities in a bizarre manner with no.attempt whatsoever to afford
portrayals of character or situation and with no pretense to literary value ...
Mr. Justice Harlan has never tried to define hard-core pornography. It can be safely said, though,
that the standards would be much more stringent than the current Roth rule, as interpreted in
the recent cases. See generally Lockhart & McClure, supra note 87, at 63-64.
" If the "hard-core pornography" test of Harlan and Stewart were to be adopted, there would
have to be some definition. During consideration of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1917),
the Solicitor-General sent to the Court a carton of what his office termed "hard-core pornography."
It would hardly do for the Court to compare only on a basis of looking at the material in the
carton every time the question arose.
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ably to judicial review when a decision is too far out of line. Justice Har-
lan would apply only the following test to a state obscenity ruling: "that it
apply criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of obscenity and
that it reach results not wholly out of step with current American stand-
ards.".'0.
Justices Black and Douglas have frequently stated their view that nei-
ther Congress nor the states is empowered to exercise any censorship con-
trol over the communication of ideas."' Mr. Justice Black argues quite
persuasively, in collateral support of his main proposition, that for pur-
poses of determining the validity of literary censorship, the federal judi-
ciary is particularly ill-equipped."' Both Douglas and Black apparently
feel that the first amendment language should be taken literally and that
no law is constitutional which restricts freedoms of speech and press.
IV. CONCLUSION
Questions concerning the necessity of censorship cannot be answered
satisfactorily to those on both sides of the basic issues. A reading of the
Supreme Court opinions certainly conveys the impression that each deci-
sion is permeated by a collective concern of the Justices for preserving
freedom of expression. If the inquiry ended at this point, most observers
could be relatively unconcerned except upon theoretical grounds of con-
stitutional law. Yet it is a harsh reality that an inquiry into the validity of
current obscenity statutes and decisions cannot stop with a reading of the
United States Reports. The careful weighing of constitutional niceties and
balancing of competing interests simply is not carried out at the admin-
istrative enforcement level. Obviously, much of the enforcement is entered
into from a biased and prejudiced point of view. It is this feeling of in-
dignation at the abuse to which the obscenity statutes have been subjected
and at the attitude taken by the postal, state, and local enforcing agencies
which causes many commentators to take a critical view of the current state
of the law. Regardless of the careful judicial review given to state or fed-
eral obscenity decisions, most cases of literary suppression will never be
reviewed at all. The coercive force of threatening a bookseller, drug store,
magazine stand, etc., with a criminal prosecution acts almost as self-
executing censorship in many areas.'O' The cost of litigation and appeal
leads one to believe that most censorship is sub-surface and is never re-
flected in reported cases. Too, where official censorship is condoned, the
' E.g., A Book, Etc. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 458 (1966) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
"'aE.g., A Book, Etc. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 424 (1966) (Douglas, J., con-
curring); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
isaE.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 516 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
"''Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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door is opened to informal and extra-legal suppression by private groups
whose methods entail no notions of due process or of freedom of speech.
Operating through the use of fear and coercion and playing on ignorance,
the damage they have done to the intellectual climate in this nation is in-
calculable."°
Against these objections must be weighed the possible valid control of
some forms of expression. Certainly "hard-core pornography," as the
term is generally understood, has no significant artistic, literary, or social
value. Perhaps the most acceptable middle ground is that suggested by
Mr. Justice Stewart in restricting the federal government and the states to
censorship of hard-core pornography.' Even in using such a test, the defi-
nition of "hard-core" pornography would have to be carefully formulated
to avoid abuse of the censorship power on a local or administrative level.
Viewing the abuses to which censorship powers have given rise, the ques-
tion of whether the game is worth the candle must be answered.
There is something disturbing and unsettling about the history of cen-
sorship, about the fact that private and public frenzy has been aroused
over the issue of whether citizens should be free to choose what they will
read and what they will see. Perhaps the strongest indictment of govern-
mental censorship is carried in Mr. Justice Stewart's statement, "Censorship
reflects a society's lack of confidence in itself....7
105See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 87, at 5-13. The groups operate through the use of
pressure tactics and, apparently, are not afraid to tackle the Supreme Court. A Book, Etc. v. At-
torney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 427-28 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring):
Every time an obscenity case is to be argued here, my office is flooded with letters
and postal cards urging me to protect the community or the Nation by striking
down the publication. The messages are often identical even down to commas and
semicolons. The inference is irresistible that they were all copied from a school or
church blackboard. Dozens of postal cards often are mailed from the same precinct.
The drives are incessant and the pressures are great. I mention them only to emphasize
the lack of understanding of our constitutional system.
1 6 See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text. The key question in a "hard-core porno-
graphy" test of obscenity would be formulating a test which would screen only such material,
leaving works with social value free even from the overzealous efforts of local enforcement. In
Philadelphia some 5,000 pieces of alleged pornography were burned in the presence of the chief of
police, superintendent of schools, and a hymn-singing choir. This took place in 1963; unfortunately
no record is available of tlse hymns selected to burn books by. See Murphy, The Value of Pornog-
raphy, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 655, 657 (1964); Lockhart & McClure, supra note 87, at 6-12.
10 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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